Defending the Public Domain—The First Amendment, the
Copyright Power, and the Potential of Golan v. Gonzales
I. Introduction
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
unequivocally that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press”;1 yet this has not been the case since Congress’s first
exercise of the Progress Clause: the Copyright Act of 1790.2 The Progress
Clause,3 which serves as the basis of United States Copyright Law, provides
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”4 On its face, the Progress Clause
appears incompatible with the First Amendment, in that it “abridg[es] the
freedom of speech” and “of the press”5 by prohibiting all speech that is
protected by the clause’s grant of “exclusive Right[s]” to “Authors and
Inventors.”6
Despite the blatant conflict, courts have generally refused to recognize the
First Amendment as a wholesale restraint on copyright.7 Consistent with the
general trend in federal courts,8 in 1985 the Supreme Court in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises held First Amendment scrutiny of
copyright unnecessary because copyright itself has built-in freedom of speech
protections in the form of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
exception.9 In 2003, the Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft tweaked this proposition
to provide that copyright is not categorically immune from challenges under
the First Amendment, but that First Amendment scrutiny is necessary where

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
3. Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining “Progress” in Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L.
REV. 754, 755 n.1 (2001) (providing that “[e]arlier academics call this the ‘Copyright and Patent
Clause.’ Since neither ‘copyright’ nor ‘patent’ appears in the text . . . the best name would be
the ‘Progress Clause.’”).
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Id. amend. I.
6. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 21:3 (2007).
8. Triangle Publ’ns v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Sid &
Mart Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977);
Wainright Sec. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977).
9. 471 U.S. 539, 556-60 (1985).
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Congress “alter[s] the traditional contours of copyright protection.”10
Although the Court did not find First Amendment scrutiny necessary under the
facts present in Eldred, the Court’s recognition that copyright’s built-in First
Amendment protections will not always be adequate subtly suggested the
potential for increased judicial recognition of the First Amendment as an
actual—rather than nominal—restraint on copyright.11
This note argues that the recent Tenth Circuit decision in Golan v.
Gonzales12 is the Eldred potential realized13—that Golan is the second step to
Eldred’s first on the path to judicial enforcement of First Amendment
protections abridged by the ever broadening grasp of copyright. Part II
discusses the relevant copyright and First Amendment principles, laws, and
cases, emphasizing the forces guiding the judicially struck balance between the
two. Part III presents the factual and procedural history of Golan, including
its position in the context of the broader challenges being made to the current
United States copyright scheme. Part IV analyzes the unanimous opinion in
Golan. Part V discusses the circuit split over the proper interpretation of
Eldred, of which Golan is a part, and the split’s likely route to the Supreme
Court. Part VI suggests that the language of Eldred, the purposes behind
copyright and the First Amendment, and the inconsistency of the alternative
approach all support the conclusion that the Tenth Circuit in Golan properly
interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance in Eldred. Part VII concludes.
II. Background Law
A. The United States Copyright Regime
The Progress Clause of the United States Constitution grants to Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”14 Congress first exercised this power
through the Copyright Act of 1790 with the purpose of creating “[a]n Act for
the encouragement of learning.”15 The First United States Congress relied
heavily on English law in forming the beginning of United States Copyright
law with the Copyright Act of 1790.16 The Act granted copyright protection
10. 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
11. Id.
12. 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
13. See supra text accompanying note 11.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831) (quoting the Act’s
preamble).
16. Edward C. Walterscheid, Understanding the Copyright Act of 1790: The Issue of
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for an initial term of fourteen years conditioned on the work being registered
and a copy deposited with an official repository.17 The term was renewable for
another fourteen-year term so long as the work was reregistered.18
The first of what would be many extensions of the copyright term came
with the 1831 revision of the original act, extending the initial term of
copyright protection to twenty-eight years while leaving the renewable term
of fourteen years unchanged.19 The Copyright Act of 1909 further extended
the potential renewal period to twenty-eight years, while maintaining the initial
term at twenty-eight years.20 Each of these extensions applied to both existing
and future copyrights; however, the extensions were not applied to copyrighted
works whose terms had expired, regardless of whether the works would have
been protected had the extension been in effect during their original terms.21
The 1909 Act further extended the reach of copyright by codifying the concept
of a derivative work, that is a work based on a pre-existing work.22 Prior to
that point, “the term ‘copy’ was interpreted literally—an author had the right
only to prevent others from copying and selling her particular work, but had
no power against modifications.”23
The Copyright Act of 1976 overhauled United States copyright law by
modifying the method for calculating the term of copyright protection,
abandoning a fixed term system in exchange for a variable standard.24 The
former standard provided for a fixed term of copyright protection with an
option for a fixed renewal term; under the 1976 Act, the term of copyright
protection became the life of the author plus fifty years.25 This act aligned the
United States copyright term with the predominate international term under the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention).26 The 1976 Act applied not only to works published on or after
Common Law Copyright in America and the Modern Interpretation of the Copyright Power, 53
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 313, 338-39 (2006). Congress relied specifically on the Statute of
Anne for the principle that copyright protection should be provided only for limited times with
the purpose of incentivizing the creation of works of art and science. Copyright Act of 1709,
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (providing for copyright protection for “the Encouragement of
Learning”).
17. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat at 124.
18. Id. §§ 1, 3.
19. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439.
20. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
21. Id.; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. at 436, 439.
22. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.
23. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (2001).
24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000).
25. Id. § 302.
26. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(3), Sept. 9,
1886, S. TREATY DOC. N O . 99-27 (1971), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention];
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its effective date of January 1, 1978, but also to previously published works,
to which the Act granted a fixed seventy-five year term beginning on the date
of publication, thereby extending those works’ previous copyright protection
under the 1909 Act by nineteen years.27 The 1976 Act also did away with all
conditions precedent to protection. Prior to 1976, copyright protection only
attached once the work was both registered with the Copyright Office and
published. Under the 1976 Act, a work was protected immediately upon
creation—that is, once “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression”—regardless of whether it was then or ever published or
registered.28
The latest term extension came in the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 (CTEA), also known as the Sonny Bono Act.29 The CTEA lengthened
the term of copyright protection to life of the author plus seventy years for
works published after January 1, 1979, the effective date of the 1976 Act.30
The CTEA also extended the copyright protection of works published prior to
1979 by adding another twenty years of protection, thus increasing the works’
protection to a fixed term of ninety-five years from the date of publication.31
This extension effectively froze the public domain. No work published in or
after 1923 will enter the public domain until at least 2019, assuming no further
extensions by Congress.
B. Justifications for Granting Copyright Protection
Copyright protection effectively grants the right holder a monopoly over use
of the work. Elementary economic theory provides that a monopoly will
produce fewer goods at a higher price as compared to a competitive market.32
Thus, as monopolists, copyright holders provide the public fewer of their
creative works at higher prices than would be created in a competitive market.
On its face, such a result is undesirable because society prefers more goods to
less; therefore, granting such exclusive rights, as did the Framers of the
Constitution, demands justification.
In drafting the Progress Clause, the Framers limited the purpose for which
Congress may grant a copyright protection. Congress’s copyright power
see infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 408.
28. Id. § 102.
29. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
31. Id. § 304.
32. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE 57 (5th ed. 2003).
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reaches only to the extent necessary to promote “the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”33 This “[p]rogress” was to be achieved through the creation of
and public access to a large base of knowledge.34 The Framers steadfastly
rejected the notion that an author has a natural or moral right to exclusive
control of his work.35 The Framers instead were instrumentalists, recognizing
copyright as a monopoly, and thus an evil allowed only as necessary for the
promotion of learning.36 James Madison recognized monopolies as “justly
classed among the greatest nuisances in government;” yet, his belief in the
importance of “literary works and ingenious discoveries” to the health of a
nation led him to find copyright “too valuable to be [wholly] renounced.”37
The Constitution not only limits the purpose for which Congress may grant
copyright, but also limits the term for which Congress may grant such
protection to “limited Times.”38 The restriction of copyright protection to
“limited Times” is further evidence of the Framers’ view that copyright should
be granted only as an instrument for the promotion of progress and not as a
right of its own accord. Limiting the term of protection would be inconsistent
with the view that copyright is a natural right, but is wholly appropriate where
copyright is viewed as a mere instrument for a greater good. The Supreme
Court has consistently accepted this construction of the Progress Clause,
recognizing that “the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor
of authors,”39 finding instead that the “sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors.”40

33. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8 (“to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).
34. E.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831) (“for the
encouragement of learning”); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay,
52 EMORY L.J. 909, 947 (2003) (quoting George Washington’s January 8, 1790 address to
Congress, “Knowledge is, in every country, the surest basis of public happiness.”).
35. 1 WILLIAM P ATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1 (2007) (recognizing copyright in the
United States as a “positive law for utilitarian purposes” and “not a property right, much less
a natural right”).
36. U.S. C ONST . art. I., § 8, cl. 8 (“to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”);
Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. at 124 (“for the encouragement of learning”); Patterson & Joyce,
supra note 34, at 947 (quoting President George Washington, Address to Congress (Jan. 8,
1790)).
37. Andrew M. Hetherington, Purpose and Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed
on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 468 (2003)
(citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788)).
38. Id.
39. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
40. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); accord Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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C. Justifications for Protecting the Freedom of Speech
Traditionally, three rationales have been put forth to justify the freedom of
speech.41 In his powerful concurrence in Whitney v. California, Justice
Brandeis discussed these three justifications.42 First, the freedom of speech
was seen by the Framers as essential to the health of free democracy; as
Brandeis recognized, the Framers “believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth.”43 Renowned copyright and First Amendment scholar
Melville Nimmer describes this function of the freedom of speech as necessary
for the enlightenment of the voters in order to ensure wise decisions of
governance.44 Thus, the freedom of speech operates in intimate symbiosis with
the democratic process such that the corruption of one is the corruption of
both.
The second justification provided by Brandeis is described by Nimmer as
free speech “as an end in itself because the very nature of man is such that he
can realize self-fulfillment only if he is free to express himself.”45
The final justification, Brandeis provides, is to forego the dangers created
by not guaranteeing free speech.46 Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence warns
“that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies.”47 Nimmer describes this as the
“safety valve” factor.48 Thus, the three justifications for the freedom of speech
are the enlightenment function, the self-fulfillment function, and the safetyvalve function.
D. A Conflict and a Judicially Struck Balance
The First Amendment prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech.49
Copyright law passed under the Progress Clause abridges speech by
prohibiting unauthorized use of copyright protected speech.50 Under a strict
41. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1186 (1970).
42. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Nimmer, supra note 41, at 1187-88 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948)).
45. Id. at 1188.
46. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Nimmer, supra note 41, at 1188.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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reading of the First Amendment, “it is difficult to see how any copyright law
can be regarded as constitutional”;51 yet, the Supreme Court has held that “the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”52
Although “intuitively in conflict,” the Progress Clause and the First
Amendment “were drafted to work together.”53 The Supreme Court recently
recognized the significance of the contemporaneous adoption of the Progress
Clause and the First Amendment, providing: “This proximity indicates that,
in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free
speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and
publication of free expression.”54 Yet, concluding that the two are
theoretically compatible is far from understanding how copyright and the First
Amendment actually coexist.
Courts have generally struck the balance between First Amendment
protections and copyright on the premise that copyright has built-in First
Amendment accommodations in the form of two doctrines limiting the scope
of copyright: the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.55 Each
safeguard arguably contours the reach of copyright to avoid unconstitutional
infringement on the freedom of speech.
Copyright law in the United States distinguishes between ideas and
expressions and affords copyright protection only to the latter.56 The
idea/expression dichotomy addresses “the danger . . . that an individual might
gain monopoly privileges over an idea,” a result that would be antithetical to
the interest of the First Amendment.57 The Supreme Court in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises recognized that “no author may
copyright facts or ideas. The copyright is limited to those aspects of the
work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s
originality.”58 The Supreme Court went on to rule that the “idea/expression
dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and
[copyright] by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression.’”59 The Supreme Court further recognized in Eldred v.
Ashcroft that the result of this limitation on copyright is that “every idea,
51. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 21:2.
52. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (emphasis
added).
53. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (2001).
54. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
55. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558; see SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 21:3.
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
57. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007).
58. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 556 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203
(2d Cir. 1983)).
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theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public
exploitation at the moment of publication.”60 Thus, “copyright assures authors
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely
upon the ideas and information conveyed by the work.”61 Where the freedom
of speech seeks to guarantee the enlightenment of people through the free-flow
of ideas,62 courts accept the idea/expression dichotomy as a means of
permitting such flow of ideas and thus avoiding conflict with the First
Amendment.
The second safeguard, the fair use doctrine, affords a privilege for the
limited use of both the idea and expression of copyrighted material without
permission from the rights holders where the use is “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”63
Although now codified, the fair use doctrine originated as a “judge-made right
developed to preserve the constitutionality of copyright legislation by
protecting First Amendment values.”64
E. The Eldred Decision
For proponents of copyright reform, the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred
v. Ashcroft initially seemed a crushing blow.65 The Eldred petitioners made
two claims regarding the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA):66 first, they
challenged the CTEA as a violation of the “limited Times” provision of the
Progress Clause, and second, they challenged the CTEA as a content-neutral
regulation of speech failing the heightened judicial scrutiny required by the
First Amendment.67 In a 7-2 decision, the Court rejected both arguments, yet
explicitly recognized that copyright would not be immune from First
Amendment scrutiny in all cases.68
The petitioners claimed that although the new copyright term under the
CTEA—the life of the author plus seventy years—was valid, the application
of that new standard to extend the protection of already published and
copyrighted works violated the “limited Times” provision of the Progress

60. 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
61. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
64. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001).
65. 537 U.S. 186.
66. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see supra text accompanying
notes 29-31.
67. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193-94.
68. Id. at 218, 221.
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Clause.69 The petitioners premised this argument on the contention that an
initial term that could be extended was by definition not “limited”; that is, once
set a term is “fixed” and “unalterable.”70 The Court rejected this reading of the
term “limited,” holding instead that “limited” only requires that the term be
initially confined within certain bounds, not that it be forever fixed.71
Second, the petitioners claimed that, as a content-neutral regulation of
speech, the CTEA should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny under the First
Amendment.72 Rejecting this argument, the Court found that strict scrutiny
review is unnecessary, not only because copyright law has built-in safeguards,
but also because the CTEA itself includes additional protections.73 The Court
recognized support for its holding in the long history of similar congressional
extensions of the term of copyright protection.74 However, most importantly,
the Eldred Court found that where Congress does not act in accordance with
history, but instead “alter[s] the traditional contours of copyright protection,”
a more searching First Amendment scrutiny must be conducted.75
In virtually all subsequent cases, Eldred has been read to set the standard for
First Amendment review of both new copyright legislation and changes to
existing copyright legislation.76 Although the Eldred “traditional contours”
standard has been widely adopted, a clear split has developed among several
circuits over its interpretation.77
F. The Berne Convention
In Golan v. Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit considered a challenge to the
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA),78 an act to bring United States
Copyright law into compliance with the principal multi-national treaty
controlling copyright law, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (Berne Convention).79 As of April 2007, 163 countries

69. Id. at 199.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 218.
73. Id. at 219.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 221.
76. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007); Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d
697 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 958 (2008); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft,
321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
77. See infra notes 176-97 and accompanying text.
78. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109).
79. Berne Convention, supra note 26.

404

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:395

were signatories to the Berne Convention.80 There are three general
requirements to membership: (1) member-states must grant works originating
in other member-states the same copyright protections granted to works
created by its own nationals;81 (2) copyright protection cannot be contingent
on formalities (i.e., protection must attach automatically);82 and (3) memberstates must grant a minimum term for copyright protection amounting to life
of the author plus fifty years.83
Article 1 of the treaty illustrates the moral rights perspective taken by the
Berne Convention, providing that the Convention forms a “Union for the
protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”84 This
moral justification for copyright protection stands in clear contrast to the
instrumental view adopted by the Framers of the United States Constitution.85
Because joining the Berne Convention would have required major changes to
the United States copyright regime, especially with regard to the moral rights
standards imposed by the treaty, the United States initially refused to join;
however, with the enactment of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, the United States became a party to the treaty.86 Despite signing, the
United States refused to comply with Article 18 of the Convention, which
required signatory countries to extend copyright protection to any work still
protected in the work’s home country.87 Article 18 would have required the
United States to grant protection to many foreign works that were in the public
domain. Because of this, the United States refused to apply the treaty
retroactively and applied the provision only with regard to works published
after March 1, 1989.88
G. The Uruguay Round Agreement Act
Following harsh international criticism for its unilateral refusal to comply
with Article 18 of the Berne Convention, the United States eventually agreed
to full compliance at the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).89 Congress subsequently adopted
80. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CIRCULAR 38A (2007), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf.
81. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 5(3).
82. Id. art. 5(2).
83. Id. art. 6(1), (6).
84. Id. art. 1.
85. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also Berne Convention, supra note 26.
87. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 18.
88. Olivia Regnier, Who Framed Article 18? The Protection of Pre-1989 Works in the USA
Under the Berne Convention, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 400, 400 (1993).
89. See, e.g., id.
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the URAA, which implemented the provisions agreed upon at the Uruguay
Round negotiations.90 In 1993, during the Uruguay Round, GATT was
updated as GATT 1994, which established the World Trade Organization
(WTO).91 Title V of the URAA implements the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which requires WTO members to
comply with Article 18 of the Berne Convention.92
Article 18 of the Berne Convention requires that member-nations provide
copyright protection to those foreign works whose protection has not yet
expired in their country of origin.93 Article 18 applies retroactively such that
although the United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1988,
Article 18 required it to extend protection to all works that were still protected
by copyright in their country of origin, regardless of whether that work had
already passed into the public domain within the United States.94 In order to
comply with Article 18’s requirement of retroactive application,95 protection
had to be restored to many foreign works still protected in their country of
origin that had fallen into the public domain in the United States.96 Section
514 of the URAA amended United States’ copyright law to restore copyright
protection to such foreign works.97 The plaintiffs in Golan challenged the
URAA’s removal of works from the public domain as a violation of their right
to free expression under the First Amendment.98
III. Statement of the Case: Golan v. Gonzales
A. The Plaintiffs
The Golan plaintiffs, in different ways, all relied on works in the public
domain for their livelihood.99 Section 514 of the URAA injured each plaintiff
90. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109).
91. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
92. See S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994).
93. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 18.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 5(2). Many of these foreign works had already fallen into the public domain for
failure to meet the formal requirements of United States copyright law, such as to register the
work, to renew protection, or to include satisfactory copyright notice. Article 5(2) of the Berne
Convention prohibits protection being subject to formalities. Id. Thus, for these works
protection would have had to be restored not only under Article 18, but also under Article 5(2).
Id.
97. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109).
98. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2007).
99. Id. at 1182.
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by removing those works from the public domain and reinstating copyright
protection.100 For example, Lawrence Golan is a professional symphony,
opera, and ballet conductor as well as the director of the orchestral studies
program at the University of Denver’s Lamont School of Music.101 As a
university director, he is “obligated to teach works by important classical and
contemporary foreign composers including composers from the 20th century”
to students who “depend on these public domain works for a well-rounded
education.”102 Unfortunately, many of these standard works are no longer
freely available in the public domain because of the URAA. As a result,
students are unable to learn much of the “industry’s ‘standard repertoire’ for
auditions, competitions, and public performances.”103
Another plaintiff, the late Richard Kapp, was an accomplished pianist and
an internationally renowned conductor.104 Kapp testified that he “depended on
the availability of musical works in the public domain for performances and
recordings for over thirty-five years.”105 Kapp went on to explain that
“copyrighted works impose significant performance fees and much higher
sheet music rental costs than public domain works . . . Thus, given budget
constraints, the vast majority of the works his orchestras perform[ed] [had to]
come from the public domain.”106 Other plaintiffs, Luck’s Music Library and
Edwin F. Kalmus, distributed orchestral sheet music from the public domain
to orchestras, symphonies, universities, and schools.107 Similarly, plaintiffs
Ron Hall and John McDonough distributed films that had passed into the
public domain.108 Luck’s Music Library, Kalmus, Hall, and McDonough have
all had to eliminate much of their catalog because of the URAA.109 Each
plaintiff in their own way furthered the dissemination of cultural works to the
public, and each has been forced by the URAA to stop or substantially curtail
this dissemination.
B. At the District Court
The plaintiffs filed the complaint on September 19, 2001, in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging that both the CTEA
100. Id.
101. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 13, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007)
(No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976.
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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and the URAA were unconstitutional for their violation of the Progress Clause,
the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause.110 Soon after, on August
23, 2002, the district court put the case on administrative retirement subject to
the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Eldred.111 Following the decision
in Eldred on January 15, 2003,112 the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
modifying their claims based on the Eldred decision.113 The Government
immediately filed a motion to dismiss all claims, asserting that Eldred
“affirmed the constitutionality of the CTEA” and “articulated in great detail
the Supreme Court’s view of the scope and meaning of the Copyright Clause
in a way that discredit[ed] [the] Plaintiffs’ challenges to the URAA.”114 The
district court granted the Government’s motion as to the plaintiffs’ claim that
the CTEA violated the Progress Clause’s “limited times” provision, but denied
the motion as to all other claims.115
Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.116 The Government’s motion117 urged the Court to follow a decision
handed down during the Golan discovery period by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Gonzales,
which held that the URAA is constitutional and not subject to First
Amendment review.118 The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
reinforced their two arguments: (1) that the URAA extends beyond the power
granted Congress under the Progress Clause, and (2) that the URAA altered
the “traditional contours of copyright protection” and thus required First
Amendment review.119 The district court granted the Government’s motion for
110. Complaint at 1, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No. 01B1854), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/golanvashcroft/complaint.pdf.
111. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
112. Id.
113. First Amended Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No.
01B-1854), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/attachments/Amended%20Complaint.pdf.
pdf.
114. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted at 3, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d
1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No. 01B-1854), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/attachments/
Renewed%20Motion%20to%20dismiss-4-30-03.pdf.
115. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004).
116. Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01B-1854, 2005 WL 914754, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005).
117. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Golan v.
Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (No. 01B-1854 (D. Colo. 2004), available at http://cyberlaw.
stanford.edu/attachments/MSJ6-23-04.pdf.
118. 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that
§ 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress’s power under the Progress Clause, nor does it
violate the First Amendment).
119. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant John Ashcroft’s Motion for Summary Judgment at
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summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’, finding that Congress had not
overstepped the bounds of the Progress Clause in passing the URAA.120
C. Appeal to the Tenth Circuit
On July 18, 2005, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The plaintiffs made three primary
contentions: (1) the URAA’s removal of works from the public domain
abridges the First Amendment right to free expression; (2) the restoration of
copyright protection to works in the public domain exceeds Congress’s power
under the Progress Clause; and (3) the current term of copyright as extended
by the CTEA has become so long as to violate the “limited Times”
requirement of the Progress Clause.121 In an opinion by Judge Robert Henry,
the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s First Amendment ruling, affirmed
all else, and remanded with orders for the district court to subject Section 514
of the URAA to First Amendment scrutiny.122
The Tenth Circuit’s decision was a result of its careful interpretation of
Eldred v. Ashcroft.123 In Eldred, the Supreme Court established a standard of
review for use when copyright also regulates speech, providing that where
copyright legislation “alter[s] the traditional contours of copyright protection”
it must be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny.124 The Golan plaintiffs
argued that the district court erred by failing to apply the Eldred standard,
claiming specifically that the URAA “disrupted the traditional contours of
copyright protection” by removing works from the public domain.125 The
plaintiffs further argued, through thorough discussion, that historical precedent
does not support Congress’s removal of works from the public domain; thus,
the URAA alters “tradition” under the Eldred standard, thereby requiring First
Amendment scrutiny.126 In response, the Government argued that the
“traditional contours of copyright protection” are limited to copyright’s builtin First Amendment safeguards—the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine; therefore, First Amendment review is unnecessary because the
URAA alters neither safeguard.127
4, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (No. 01B-1854) (D. Colo. 2004), available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/attachments/PlaintiffsSJOppBrief.pdf.
120. Golan, 2005 WL 914754.
121. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 101, at 20.
122. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
123. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
124. Id. at 221.
125. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1185-86.
126. Id. at 1189-92.
127. Brief for the Appellees at 23, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (No. 05-1259) (10th
Cir. 2005), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/govt_response.pdf.
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Although Eldred provides the standard for considering the free speech
implications of a copyright law, it provides little guidance regarding its
application. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit began its review by refining this
standard through consideration of what the phrase “traditional contours”
entails. The court recognized that “the term [traditional contours] seems to
refer to something broader than copyright’s built-in free speech
accommodations.”128 The court rejected the Government’s argument that
“traditional contours” is limited to the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine.129 With this conclusion, a split formed, as the Ninth Circuit 130
and the District Court for the District of Columbia131 have, to the contrary of
the Tenth Circuit, agreed with the limited view of “traditional contours”
proposed by the Government.
1. The Tenth Circuit’s Framework for “Traditional Contours” Analysis
The Tenth Circuit separated the “traditional contours” analysis into a
functional and a historical component. The functional component, represented
by “contour,” encompasses the general form or structure of copyright law.132
Under it, the court reviews whether “the ordinary procedure of copyright
protection” has been altered by Congress.133 This procedure includes the way
in which the reach of copyright protection is bounded by the public domain.134
Considering the historical component, Judge Henry provided that the Eldred
Court’s qualification of the “contours” as “traditional” suggests “that
Congress’s historical practice with respect to copyright and the public domain
must inform our inquiry.”135
a) The Functional Component
The Tenth Circuit, considering the functional component, recognized as a
“contour” the sequence in which a work moves through copyright, and thus
considered whether the URAA altered that sequence.136 Until Section 514 of
the URAA, every statutory scheme maintained the same sequence. The
sequence begins with an author’s creation of an original expression. Copyright
128. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189-92.
129. Id.
130. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 958 (2008).
131. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d on
other grounds, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
132. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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law then grants the expression a limited period of copyright protection and,
upon expiration, the work passes permanently into the public domain.137 The
URAA distorts this sequence such that the public domain is not always the
end, and may sometimes even be the beginning.138 Thus, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that “by copyrighting works in the public domain, the URAA has
altered the ordinary copyright sequence,”139 a “traditional contour[] of
copyright protection,” and must be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny.
Further, in consideration of the functional component, the court in Golan
identified a second “contour” of copyright—the character of works in the
public domain.140 With abundant citation, the court established the great
judicial weight behind the proposition that works within the public domain
cannot be copyrighted.141 The court concluded that, by copyrighting works in
the public domain, the URAA “extend[ed] a limited monopoly to expressions
historically beyond the pale of such privileges,” and thus “contravened a
bedrock principle of copyright law” altering its “traditional contours.”142
b) The Historical Component
Turning to the historical component, the Golan court concluded that “[t]he
history of American copyright law reveals no tradition of copyrighting works
in the public domain.”143 The Tenth Circuit’s inquiry looked to whether
removal of works from the public domain is consistent with the Framers’ view
of copyright law and Congress’s historical practices. Regarding the Framers’
view, the court recognized, as has a consensus of scholars, that the Framers’
view on copyrighting works in the public domain is “probably not just unclear
but also unknowable”144 because the common law of the United States at the
time the states ratified the Constitution “was in a highly uncertain state on the
subject of copyrights.”145 Further, other standard sources of the Framers’
intent, such as the Federalist Papers and Madison’s notes from the
Constitutional Convention, give little attention to the subject.146 Because of
the scarcity of supporting evidence, the court refused to conclude that the

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1189-90.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1192.
143. Id. at 1190.
144. Id. at 1191 (citing Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 332).
145. Id. at 1190 (quoting 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE C ONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 477 (1953)).
146. Id.
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Framers viewed removal of works from the public domain as consistent with
the copyright scheme.147
Regarding congressional practice, the court considered certain war time acts
that “may have had the effect of removing a very small number of works from
the public domain,” concluding that such limited actions under unusual and
non-traditional circumstances are not sufficient to establish removal of works
from the public domain as a “traditional contour,” especially where the passing
of the acts was not necessarily even constitutional.148 Thus, the court held that
“under both the functional and historical components of our inquiry, Section
514 has altered the traditional contours of copyright protection.”149
2. Applying Eldred’s Three Factors
The Golan court next considered Section 514 of the URAA in light of the
three factors that led the Eldred Court to find the CTEA is consistent with
copyright’s “traditional contours.”150 First, the Eldred Court concluded that
the speech interests at issue involved the right to repeat the speech of others,
which is entitled to less protection under the First Amendment than one’s own
speech.151 Second, the Eldred Court found that copyright law’s “built-in First
Amendment accommodations—the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use
defense” adequately protected the First Amendment interests at stake in the
case.152 Finally, the Eldred Court noted that Congress included additional
protections in the CTEA beyond copyright’s own built-in safeguards in order
to ensure the public’s access to protected expression.153 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit applied these three factors to the URAA: (1) the nature of the speech
involved and the relative amount of First Amendment protection it is afforded,
(2) the adequacy of copyright’s built-in protections, and (3) the additional
protection of First Amendment interests within the legislation at issue.154
a) The Nature of the Speech at Issue
Regarding the first factor, the Tenth Circuit began by characterizing the
nature of the free speech interests at issue. The court acknowledged that, at the
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1192 (citing 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9A.07[A], 9A-79 to -80 (2007) and
arguing that with regard to the wartime acts Congress was “simply [] sweep[ing] the
constitutional issues under the rug”).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1189 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220-21 (2003)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1184 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20).
153. Id. (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220).
154. Id. at 1193.
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time the works at issue passed into the public domain, the plaintiffs possessed
a non-exclusive, unrestrained right to use the works.155 Consequently, the
Tenth Circuit recognized that the First Amendment protects such a right.156
Further, the manner in which the plaintiffs used the works guaranteed them
especially strong protection because “[t]he Supreme Court has emphasized that
the right to artistic expression is near the core of the First Amendment.”157 The
court considered the situation of Plaintiff John Blackburn, a high school band
director who, relying on the principle work passing into the public domain,
arranged a derivative work based on Dmitri Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 5
to be played at an event commemorating September 11. Because the
Shostakovich work had passed into the public domain, the court found that Mr.
Blackburn had the right to create his derivative piece and that Section 514 of
the URAA interfered with his right to use his own legally created work by
making the cost of performing such work prohibitive due to licensing.158
Therefore, regarding the nature of the speech at issue, the court found that the
plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests in public domain works were stronger
than that of the Eldred plaintiffs who did not, nor had they ever, possessed
unrestricted access to any works at issue.159 While the Eldred plaintiffs’ First
Amendment interests were in “making other people’s speeches,” for example
in distributing books from the public domain,160 the plaintiffs in Golan used
“publically available works to create their own artistic productions,” thus the
speech at issue in Golan belonged to the plaintiffs themselves.161
b) Copyright’s Built-In Free Speech Protections
The Tenth Circuit determined that, unlike in Eldred, copyright’s built-in
free speech safeguards—the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine—are not adequate to address the threat to First Amendment interests
posed by URAA’s removal of works from the public domain.162 The court
reached this conclusion on the grounds that the danger addressed by the
idea/expression dichotomy, monopolies over ideas, is not the danger
threatened by the URAA, the removal of works from the public domain.163

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1193 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)).
Id.
Id. at 1193-94.
Id.
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The Tenth Circuit also found that the fair use doctrine was not adequate to
address the First Amendment interests threatened by Section 514.164 The
plaintiffs had a right to unrestricted use of the works at issue before the URAA
removed those works from the public domain.165 Where applicable, the fair
use doctrine provides limited use for limited purposes in situations where no
use would otherwise be allowed. Applying the fair use doctrine to the present
case would allow only limited use where unrestricted use had previously been
allowed, thereby infringing on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.166 Thus,
the Tenth Circuit held that limited use in limited circumstances does not serve
as “an adequate substitute for the unlimited access enjoyed before the URAA
was enacted.”167
In broadly discussing the finding that copyright’s built-in safeguards are not
sufficient in the present case, the court explained that such safeguards are
“designed to govern the distribution of rights between authors and the public
from the moment a work is created and copyrighted until the copyright
expires.”168 Accordingly, the court recognized that once a work reaches the
public domain no such need for distribution of rights is necessary as all enjoy
unrestricted access.169
c) Additional Protections in the Legislation at Issue
The URAA includes none of the supplemental First Amendment protections
found in the CTEA. In Eldred, the Supreme Court found that First
Amendment review of the CTEA was not necessary, in part, because the
CTEA provides additional protections beyond those built in to copyright,
including exceptions for libraries and exemptions from licensing-fees for small
businesses.170 The URAA, on the other hand, provides only a safe harbor
provision that allows a party receiving notice of the restoration of the
copyright to continue use of the work for a limited time.171
The Tenth Circuit thus held that Section 514 of the URAA alters the
“traditional contours” of copyright law by removing works from the public
domain.172 Further, the factors that led the Supreme Court in Eldred to
determine that the CTEA did not infringe upon the First Amendment were not
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220-21 (2003).
17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2) (2000).
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1187-88.
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present with the URAA and the Golan plaintiffs.173 The Tenth Circuit
remanded for First Amendment scrutiny of Section 514 by the district court.174
The Tenth Circuit summarily rejected the Government’s petition for rehearing
en banc on January 4, 2008.175
IV. Discussion
A. The Circuit Split
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred, courts have widely accepted
that new copyright legislation and changes to existing copyright legislation are
subject to First Amendment scrutiny where they fall within copyright’s
“traditional contours.”176 Nonetheless, two conflicting readings of the Eldred
“traditional contours” standard have arisen among the circuit courts. In cases
involving First Amendment challenges to copyright laws based on Eldred,
those challenging the law have consistently asserted that “traditional contours”
means just that—the longstanding, established form of copyright law.177 In
opposition, the government consistently argues that “traditional contours”
includes only copyright’s two built-in First Amendment safeguards, and thus,
Eldred requires First Amendment review of copyright legislation if and only
if it alters either the idea/expression dichotomy or the fair use doctrine.178
The Tenth Circuit in Golan agreed with the interpretation of the challengers,
finding that “the term [traditional contours] seems to refer to something
broader than copyright’s built-in free speech accommodations.”179 The Tenth
Circuit defined the term to include the “bedrock principle[s]” founded upon
the general form or structure of copyright protection from both a functional
and historical perspective.180
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit accepted the government’s position in Kahle
v. Gonzales.181 The Kahle plaintiffs challenged the Copyright Renewal Act of
173. Id. at 1188.
174. Id. at 1196.
175. Golan v. Mukasey, No. 05-1259 (10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2008), available at
http://lessig.org/blog/Rehearing-denied.pdf.
176. See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184; Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 958 (2008); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d
107, 119 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 321 Studios
v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
177. See Reply to Brief in Opposition at 4, Kahle v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 958 (No. 07-189),
2007 WL 4340897.
178. E.g., Brief for the Appellees, supra note 127, at 23-27.
179. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189.
180. Id. at 1187, 1189.
181. 487 F.3d 697; see also Luck’s Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (accepting the
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1992 (CRA),182 which eliminated the renewal requirement for the extended
protection afforded to works created between 1964 and 1977.183 The plaintiffs
asserted that the change from discretionary to automatic renewal of
copyrights—from an opt-in to an opt-out system—altered the “traditional
contours of copyright [protection]” and thus requires First Amendment
review.184 The Kahle court, however, rejected the characterization of the CRA
as a change from an opt-in to an opt-out system.185 Instead, taking a more
liberal approach, the Ninth Circuit characterized the CRA as merely a tool for
bringing the protection afforded to older works into parity with the protection
afforded to newer works under the CTEA.186 In doing so, the court was able
to frame the challenge in Kahle to bring it under the purview of its own
interpretation of Eldred, and it held that copyright laws intending to bring
older works into parity with newer works are permissible without First
Amendment review.
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit accepted the
government’s position that Eldred requires First Amendment scrutiny only
where the traditional First Amendment safeguards are altered. The Tenth
Circuit’s holding in Golan came in direct contrast to this decision.
B. The Route to Resolution
On January 4, 2008, two separate decisions of importance were handed
down. Most directly, the Tenth Circuit in Golan v. Mukasey denied the
Government’s motion for rehearing en banc.187 In the motion, the Government
relied on its position that Eldred calls for First Amendment review only where
Congress alters either the idea/expression dichotomy or the fair use doctrine,
and asserted that the panel decision was in error in finding otherwise.188 This
motion is the most thorough exposition of the government’s interpretation of
the Eldred standard to date.

Government’s position that Eldred’s “traditional contours” include only the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine).
182. Pub. L. No. 102-307, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 264) 756 (altering the copyright
system to eliminate the renewal requirement for works created between 1964 and 1977).
183. Kahle, 487 F.3d at 699.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 700.
186. Id.
187. No. 05-1259 (10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2008), available at http://lessig.org/blog/Rehearing.
denied.pdf.
188. Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Golan v. Mukasey, No. 051259 (10th Cir. 2007), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Golan+Response+
to+Govt+Petition+for+Rehearing.pdf.

416

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:395

On the same day, in Kahle v. Mukasey, the United States Supreme Court
denied the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari.189 The petitioners framed
the appeal around the circuit split created by Golan on the issue of whether
Eldred’s “traditional contours” include more than just copyright’s built-in First
Amendment safeguards.190 The Government offered two arguments in
response.191 First, it argued that although Golan created a “tension” among the
circuits, the panel misinterpreted Eldred and the split would be resolved upon
rehearing en banc.192 Second, the Government argued that “[w]hile the results
and reasoning of the two decisions are in tension, there is no actual conflict”
because the courts were reviewing two separate laws, the URAA and the
CRA.193 Thus, in essence, the Government argued that although the circuits
provided conflicting and incompatible definitions of “traditional contours,”
there was no conflict, and it is acceptable to apply Eldred in a new way in
every situation. The latter argument is unconvincing, and would likely carry
little weight with the Supreme Court, as it is beyond question that the Eldred
standard, like any judicial standard, should be applied consistently. In
response, the Kahle petitioners asked the Court, at a minimum, to hold the
petition for certiorari until the Tenth Circuit resolved whether to grant a
petition for rehearing.194 Somewhat ironically, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on the same day the Tenth Circuit denied rehearing.
These decisions set the stage for Supreme Court review of the decision in
Golan. Although the challenge in Kahle examining the change from an opt-in
to an opt-out system certainly provided a clearer framing of the issue, the
Tenth Circuit’s refusal of rehearing en banc entrenches the issue and removes
the obstacle argued by the Government in opposition to certiorari in Kahle.
Two potential paths exist for the split to reach the Supreme Court. First, the
Tenth Circuit’s remand could proceed from a decision by the district court to
an inevitable appeal to the Tenth Circuit and finally to the Supreme Court to
resolve the issue. Alternatively, the Government could directly appeal the
decision of the Tenth Circuit by arguing that removal of works from the public
domain is an alteration of the “traditional contours” of copyright protection.
For the plaintiffs, the most desirable outcome would naturally be for the
decision in their favor at the Tenth Circuit to stand and for the case to proceed
to the district court for First Amendment review. Nonetheless, the alternative
189. 128 S. Ct. 958 (2008).
190. Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 177, at 1.
191. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Kahle v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 958 (No. 07189), 2007 WL 4218439.
192. Id. at 12-13.
193. Id. at 13.
194. Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 177, at 8-9.

2008]

NOTES

417

result of a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the Tenth Circuit’s
interpretation of the Eldred “traditional contours” standard has its own
advantages. Although Supreme Court review would be somewhat undesirable
to the plaintiffs themselves because in the short run it places the ground gained
in jeopardy, direct review would have advantages for the proponents of
copyright reform whom the plaintiffs represent. A decision by the Supreme
Court affirming the Golan challengers’ interpretation of Eldred would pave the
way for further challenges to existing copyright laws and place a real
limitation on Congress’s future legislation.
For the Government, the manner in which the case proceeds is significantly
more critical. Although the Government would hope to successfully defend
the constitutionality of the URAA in its present form, its arguably more
pressing concern lies in the precedent established by Golan. The definition of
“traditional contours” provided by Golan calls into question the
constitutionality of other copyright legislation and thus encourages further
challenges. For example, the unsuccessful challenge to the Copyright Renewal
Act of 1992 made in Kahle would be given a new life in the Tenth Circuit,195
as the opt-in nature of the system was a defining characteristic of the United
States copyright regime for 186 years, from the first Copyright Act of 1790
through the Copyright Act of 1976. The opt-in system would almost certainly
be deemed a “traditional contour.” This is especially likely in light of the
same finding in Golan with regard to the relatively less central principle that
works in the public domain cannot be copyrighted.196 Thus, the goal of the
Government must be not just to win the case, but to win the case in a way that
overturns the precedent of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Golan.
The Government’s delicate objective makes it a dangerous proposition for
the case to reach the district court. If the Government were to win at the
district court level—that is if the URAA were to survive First Amendment
scrutiny—then the Government would lack standing to appeal, and although
the URAA survives, so does the precedent of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion.197
If the Government was to lose at the district court, it would have the
opportunity to argue on appeal that the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Eldred
standard incorrectly and that First Amendment review was unnecessary. Yet,
in such circumstances, the issue they would seek to appeal, whether First
195. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007).
196. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1192.
197. In this scenario, the possibility exists that the plaintiffs could appeal a loss at the district
court level through to the Supreme Court, where the Government would have the opportunity
to argue in the alternative that, even if the Court finds the URAA does not withstand First
Amendment scrutiny, under the Eldred standard First Amendment review was nonetheless not
appropriate. This argument however is both awkward and unlikely to be successful.
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Amendment review was even necessary, would be seriously muddled. The
Tenth Circuit would be asked to find that First Amendment scrutiny was not
proper for a piece of legislation that had already been found to
unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment.
Instead, the Government will likely, and most prudently, appeal the decision
of the Tenth Circuit directly. Such action preserves the issue for the
Government as a pure de novo review of an isolated legal issue—whether the
“traditional contours of copyright protection” include more than the built-in
First Amendment safeguards. Although the Government will certainly argue
in the alternative that even under the Golan court’s definition of “traditional
contours” First Amendment review is unnecessary, this argument is likely to
fail and the Government’s case hinges victory on the former issue.
A Government petition for certiorari to the Tenth Circuit’s decision would
likely be successful. The arguments made in support of the grant of certiorari
by the petitioners in Kahle198 remain equally applicable to Golan.199 As
Congress repeatedly acts to rebalance the interests at play in copyright law in
order to facilitate the rapid changes of a digital world, proper application of the
Eldred rule is vital to ensure that Congress can effectively operate within the
boundaries of the Constitution.200 Further, what the Government characterizes
as merely “tension” among the circuits at the time of the Kahle petition has
matured in to a complete circuit split. Thus, as similar copyright challenges
will continue to be made to different statutes, further guidance from the
Supreme Court is needed.
V. A Suggestion on the Proper Resolution of the Circuit Split
The “traditional contours of copyright protection” include not only the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, but also all other
“contours” within the historical structure of copyright law. This conclusion
becomes clear for four reasons: (1) the interpretation is clearly supported by
the language of Eldred; (2) the alternative interpretation is incompatible with
the plain language of Eldred; (3) adoption of the alternative position advanced
by the Government would produce absurd results; and (4) the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the alternative interpretation as adopted by the D.C. Circuit
Court in Eldred below.

198. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007) (No.
07-189), 2007 WL 2323450.
199. Golan, 501 F.3d 1179.
200. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 198.
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A. The Plain Language of Eldred Supports the Tenth Circuit’s
Interpretation
The language of the Eldred decision is the most apparent support for the
view that the “traditional contours” include more than just copyright’s two
built-in First Amendment safeguards. A clear reading of the standard provided
in Eldred can be accomplished by breaking it down into its components. First,
the purpose of Eldred is to ensure an effective balance between protection of
the First Amendment from copyright and appropriate deference to Congress
in exercising its copyright power. Eldred achieves this by identifying the
dangers faced by the First Amendment and addressing them with an
appropriate level of protection in proportion to the level of risk involved.201
Eldred recognizes two levels of danger that the First Amendment may face
from copyright—a relatively high level of danger and a relatively low level of
danger. To determine what level of danger is faced from a particular copyright
law, the Supreme Court provided that where Congress alters the “traditional
contours of copyright protection” the First Amendment faces a relatively high
level of danger; otherwise, copyright’s built-in safeguards are “generally
adequate,” and the First Amendment faces a relatively low level of danger.202
In providing that copyright’s built-in First Amendment safeguards are
“generally adequate” to address the concerns faced, the Eldred Court creates
the clear inference that normally the First Amendment will face a relatively
low level of danger.203 Yet, “generally adequate” also implies that in certain
situations the built-in safeguards will not be sufficient on their own to protect
the First Amendment. In these situations, the First Amendment faces a
relatively high level of danger from copyright. This division makes sense; in
light of the longstanding historical balance between First Amendment and
copyright interests, congressional action within that traditional balance raises
no real alarms, but once Congress transgresses that balance, the assurances of
tradition are no longer present.
In order to ensure both proper deference to Congress and sufficient
protection of the First Amendment, Eldred provides for two separate levels of
protection corresponding to the two levels of danger potentially faced.204 The
first level of protection is copyright’s historical structural balance, including
the built-in First Amendment safeguards.205 The Court recognized this
safeguard as generally adequate to address the relatively low level of danger
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 221.
Id. (emphasis added).
Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
Id. at 219-20.
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when Congress works within the bounds of tradition.206 The second level of
protection comes in the form of First Amendment judicial scrutiny. The court
finds this safeguard necessary to address the relatively high level of danger
when Congress disrupts copyright’s historical balance—that is, alters the
“traditional contours of copyright protection.”207
This explanation illustrates the system set forth by the Eldred court;
however, neither the Government, nor the collective plaintiffs dispute that First
Amendment review is necessary where Congress alters the “traditional
contours” of copyright protection. The conflict arising initially between the
Government and the plaintiffs, and now between United States circuit courts,
is over what the definition of “traditional contours” includes. Nevertheless, an
understanding of the system remains valuable because a proper understanding
of the details of the Eldred process leaves only one coherent definition of
“traditional contours.”
The confusion in interpreting the standard set forth in Eldred seems to stem
from the Government’s ignorance of—and the collective plaintiffs’ failure to
emphasize—the fact that the built-in First Amendment safeguards serve two
independent roles. The built-in First Amendment safeguards serve as
“traditional contours of copyright protection,” as they are certainly a part of
the structure of copyright law; however, in the Eldred standard, the role of the
safeguards as a part of the “traditional contours” is only secondary. First and
foremost, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine serve within
the Eldred system as the First Amendment’s front-line, and where the dangers
are low, the only line of protection. This recognition—that the built-in First
Amendment safeguards’ primary role is as a protective measure—is vital to a
proper interpretation of the language of Eldred. Recognizing that the
Government fails to see both facets reveals how it came to the erroneous
determination that the safeguards alone constitute the “traditional contours.”
That is, the Government seems to read the issue in Eldred as whether the
protection of First Amendment review of the CTEA is necessary. Recognition
of the real question answered by the Eldred Court—not whether, but how
much protection is necessary to guard First Amendment interests—reveals the
error of the Government’s interpretation. That the latter is the proper
characterization of the issue is clear from the language of the Eldred Court
itself. In fact, the Court based its conclusion that First Amendment review is
unnecessary on its finding that copyright’s built-in First Amendment
safeguards, functioning in their role as a protective measure, provided

206. Id. at 221.
207. Id.
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adequate protection with regard to the CTEA, thus making the further
protection of judicial scrutiny unnecessary.208
The Government’s interpretation of “traditional contours” is based on an
improper assumption. The Government erroneously contends that the
Supreme Court’s thorough discussion of copyright’s built-in safeguards in the
three pages prior to setting forth the “traditional contours” standard suggests
that the “traditional contours” include only these safeguards. The assumption
that the Court’s discussion is an exposition of the “traditional contours”
standard, however, is improper. In light of the real question faced by the
Court—how much protection is necessary—the Court’s thorough discussion
of the built-in safeguards becomes visible for what it is: a discussion of why
the built-in safeguards offer sufficient protection in the case of the CTEA such
that First Amendment judicial review is unnecessary. The “traditional
contours” language that follows the Court’s discussion of the safeguards is in
fact used to express a different proposition all together. That is, the discussion
of copyright’s built-in safeguards is offered to show that those safeguards are
sufficient in the present case. In contrast, the “traditional contours” language
is used not to resolve the Eldred case itself, but instead to recognize that
although not necessary in the present case, First Amendment review could be
necessary in other cases.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation Would Frustrate the Purpose Behind
Eldred
The purpose of the Eldred Court, in establishing the “traditional contours”
standard, would be frustrated under the Government’s interpretation of
“traditional contours.” The Court’s purpose was to ensure that Congress is
accorded the appropriate level of deference with regard to copyright law while
still providing the First Amendment sufficient protection against infringement.
The Eldred Court achieves this purpose by recognizing that the traditional
structure of copyright law creates a balance between the interests of copyright
and the interests of the First Amendment, and that this balance generally
provides an adequate level of protection to the First Amendment such that
intrusive judicial review can often be avoided. This balance operates in the
Eldred Court’s standard to justify not requiring First Amendment scrutiny. If
the balance was disrupted, one would expect that First Amendment scrutiny
would then be required. This is precisely what the Eldred Court provides by
holding that the balance is disrupted and thus First Amendment scrutiny is
required whenever Congress alters the “traditional contours of copyright

208. Id.
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protection.”209 Because the Court’s intention for the “traditional contours”
standard is to define when the balance between copyright and the First
Amendment is disrupted, it follows that any definition of “traditional
contours” would have to be broad enough to effectuate this purpose. That is,
any change in copyright law that displaces the balance must necessarily be one
that alters the “traditional contours of copyright protection.” If this was not the
case, situations would exist where Congress could change copyright in a way
that disrupted the balance of interests, thereby eliminating the Court’s original
justification for not requiring First Amendment review, yet still not be subject
to First Amendment review. Such an interpretation could not be the intention
of the Eldred Court, yet this is precisely what the Government argues and the
Ninth Circuit has accepted.
For example, prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, a work had to be published
to be eligible for copyright protection. This requirement certainly played a
role in ensuring the balance between copyright and the First Amendment. The
requirement of publication functioned to “guarantee that new ideas, or new
expressions of old ideas, would be accessible to the public” and thus free
expression would be encouraged with more content to express.210 The
Copyright Act of 1976 eliminated this requirement.211 Because the balance of
interests was disrupted, the guarantees of tradition are no longer present and
the logic of Eldred requires First Amendment review. Therefore, in order to
fulfill the purpose of Eldred, the definition given to “traditional contours”
should produce this result. This is precisely the result produced by the
interpretation of Eldred by the Tenth Circuit, as the publication requirement
would certainly be found to be a “traditional contour.” In contrast, the
interpretation accepted by the Ninth Circuit would frustrate the purpose of
Eldred as the publication requirement, although a vital part of the definitional
balance, would not be found to be a “traditional contour” as it is not one of the
two built-in First Amendment safeguards. Despite upsetting the First
Amendment copyright balance, the law would not be subject to First
Amendment review under the Government’s interpretation of Eldred.
C. The Eldred Court Expressly Rejected the Government’s Position as Held
by the D.C. Circuit Court Below
Not only does the plain language and purpose of Eldred reveal that the
Government’s interpretation is incorrect, but the Supreme Court has also
expressly rejected the same proposition made by the D.C. Circuit in deciding
209. Id.
210. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001).
211. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104 (2000).
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Eldred below. The D.C. Circuit found that “copyrights are categorically
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”212 Although this
language suggests the D.C. Circuit thought copyright completely immune, the
court went on to clarify that this immunity protects Congress in those instances
where the copyright legislation regulates “works on the latter half of the
‘idea/expression dichotomy’ [i.e., expressions] and makes them subject to fair
use . . . [as] [t]his obviates further inquiry under the First Amendment.”213 In
other words, the D.C. Circuit found that copyright legislation must not
undergo First Amendment review so long as the traditional built-in safeguards
are not changed. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this position on
review, writing: “We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when
it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment.’ But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny
is unnecessary.”214 Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that First Amendment review
is only necessary when copyright's built-in safeguards are changed, and the
Supreme Court rejected that holding as limiting First Amendment review to
too narrow of circumstances. Not only does the Government in Golan now
argue a position firmly rejected by the Eldred Court—that First Amendment
review is only necessary for changes to copyright's built-in safeguards—but
it also asserts that argument in reliance on the precise language that the
Supreme Court previously used to reject it in Eldred—“the traditional contours
of copyright protection.” In essence, the Government’s argument is that,
although the Supreme Court previously rejected this position, the proposition
they replace it with means the same thing.
D. The Interpretation of Eldred Accepted by the Ninth Circuit Produces
Absurd Results
Under the Government’s interpretation of Eldred, where the only grounds
giving rise to First Amendment scrutiny are alterations to the idea/expression
dichotomy or the fair use doctrine, copyright law would be immunized from
First Amendment review in many irrational situations. The Government’s
interpretation of Eldred would effectively permit Congress to censor at will by
couching its action as copyright law. For example, suppose Congress passed
a law removing from copyright protection all works expressing partisan
political ideas. Congress could provide the rationale that partisan ideas create
conflict and that discouraging such works would lead to a more peaceful
212. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
213. Id. at 376.
214. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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society. Under the Golan court’s interpretation of Eldred, such a law would
certainly alter the “traditional contours of copyright protection.” Yet, despite
the law’s blatant chilling of political speech, the law would not be subject to
First Amendment review under the Government’s interpretation of Eldred, as
it alters neither the idea/expression dichotomy nor the fair use doctrine. The
Golan plaintiffs themselves made similar arguments in opposition to rehearing
en banc, providing the example of Congress passing a law prohibiting
copyright protection for hate speech or removing copyright protection from
works by convicted criminals.215 No court would exempt such a law from First
Amendment review,216 yet such a law would not be subject to scrutiny under
the Government’s interpretation of Eldred because neither alters the built-in
safeguards. Clearly, such outrageous results could not be the intention of the
Supreme Court.
VI. Conclusion
Two-hundred and twenty years ago, the Framers feared copyright as a
dangerous monopoly, accepted only as necessary for the development of a rich
public domain. Today, not fear, but fondness motivates Congress in the area
of copyright. Little pretense remains that copyright is but a means to the
enrichment of the public domain; instead, copyright appears to exist as an end
in itself. It is thus appropriate that free expression, the right with the most to
lose, stands as the greatest defense against neglect of the public domain.
Where copyright is “the engine of free expression,”217 the public domain is its
fuel. As Congress’s copyright policy continues to press at the public domain,
Golan v. Gonzales is a signal that the First Amendment has begun to press
back.
J. Blake Pinard
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